Court of Appeals Division I
                               State of Washington

                            Opinion Information Sheet

Docket Number:       54101-3-I
Title of Case:       Steven A. Lewis, Respondent v. State of Washington,
                     D.O.L., Petitioner
File Date:           02/07/2005

                                SOURCE OF APPEAL
Appeal from Superior Court of King County
Docket No:      03-2-03671-4
Judgment or order under review
Date filed:     03/24/2004
Judge signing:  Hon. Mary I Yu

Authored by Susan Agid
Concurring: Ann Schindler
            Faye Kennedy

                                COUNSEL OF RECORD
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
            Masako Kanazawa
            Attorney at Law
            900 4th Ave Ste 2000
            Seattle, WA  98164-1076

Counsel for Respondent(s)
            Ryan Boyd Robertson
            Attorney at Law
            2104 SW 152nd Ste 4
            Burien, WA  98166


STEVEN A. LEWIS,                                 )
               Respondent,                       ) No. 54101-3-I
                                                 ) )
STATE OF WASHINGTON,                             )
DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING,                         ) )
               Appellant.                        )
-------------------------------------------------)- --
                                                 ) STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
No. 54527-2-I
               Respondent,                       )
v.                                               ) PUBLISHED OPINION
                                                 ) KENNETH D. HIGGINS, ) FILED:
               Appellant.                        )

AGID, J. -- In each of these linked cases, video cameras mounted in police
cars made audio recordings of the conversations between arresting officers
and drivers stopped for suspicion of driving under the influence of
intoxicants (DUI).  The drivers, Steven Lewis and Kenneth Higgins, assert
that the recordings violate their privacy act rights because they did not
comply with the Act's 'in-car video' procedures, RCW 9.73.090(1)(c).  In
Lewis' case, the Department of Licensing (DOL) rejected the argument and
revoked his license.  The superior court reversed, and DOL appeals from
that order.  The district court in Higgins' case suppressed both the
recording and testimony relating to it.  The superior court reversed, and
Higgins appeals that decision.  DOL and the State argue that the privacy
act does not apply because it covers only private conversations.  They
assert there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation with
a police officer who has pulled a driver over on suspicion of DUI.  As a
result, these could not be private conversations covered by the Act.  Lewis
and Higgins contend that the Act covers any conversation with a police
officer resulting from a traffic stop unless the officer complies with the
privacy act by informing the driver that the conversation is being
We hold that the privacy act applies only to private conversations, and the
amendment governing sound recordings on which Lewis and Higgins rely does
not expand the scope of the Act to cover the conversations at issue in
their cases.  Because these conversations were not private, the police
officers were not required to notify the drivers that they were making an
audio recording, and those recordings should not have been suppressed.  We
reverse the superior court in Lewis and reinstate DOL's driver's license
revocation order.  We affirm the superior court's order reversing the
district court in Higgins.
Department of Licensing v. Lewis
     Around 1:00 a.m. on December 12, 2002, Officer Douglas Faini of the
Auburn Police Department observed Steven Lewis driving over the speed
limit.  He saw Lewis turn quickly into a restaurant parking lot without
signaling and throw a beer can out of the window just before he stopped.  A
video camera mounted in Officer Faini's police car made audio and video
recordings of the conversation between Faini and Lewis.
     Officer Faini approached Lewis' truck and began talking to him.  Lewis
was totally unresponsive and visibly intoxicated.  Officer Faini called for
additional officers to help arrest Lewis, who would not get out of his
truck.  After repeated warnings with no response from Lewis, another
officer used a taser to get him out of the truck.  At this point the
officers handcuffed Lewis, and Officer Faini arrested him and placed him in
the police car.1
     At the police station, Officer Faini read Lewis the statutory implied
consent warnings.2  Lewis refused to take a breath test.  Based on Officer
Faini's sworn report, DOL revoked Lewis' driver's license for two years.3
Lewis contested the revocation at a DOL administrative hearing, where he
moved to suppress all the State's evidence because Officer Faini violated
his privacy act rights by not advising him he was being recorded.  The
hearing examiner upheld the revocation, finding that Officer Faini had
advised Lewis that he was being recorded.  Lewis appealed this decision to
King County Superior Court, which overturned the revocation.  It ruled that
substantial evidence did not support DOL's finding that Officer Faini
advised Lewis about the recording, and that the privacy act's exclusionary
rule required suppression of all evidence before the hearing examiner.
State v. Higgins
     On the evening of October 20, 2001, based on a witness's report of
erratic driving, State Trooper S.M. Cheek began following the car Kenneth
Higgins was driving.  After observing sustained weaving, Trooper Cheek
activated his lights and pulled Higgins over.  A video camera mounted in
Cheek's police car made audio and video recordings of the conversation
between Trooper Cheek and Higgins.
     When Trooper Cheek approached the driver's side window, his first
statement to Higgins was 'I want to let you know you're being recorded.'
Higgins responded to Trooper Cheek's questions but when he refused to
perform field sobriety tests, Trooper Cheek arrested Higgins on suspicion
of DUI.  After putting Higgins in the police car, Trooper Cheek read him
his Miranda rights and asked 'Do you understand these rights? I'm going to
remind you that you are being recorded.'  When they arrived at the police
station, Officer Cheek took Higgins inside, and neither of them appears on
the video portion of the recording again.  But the audio portion of the
recording continued during their conversation inside the station.
     On May 14, 2003, the King County District Court granted Higgins'
motion to suppress the recording and all evidence obtained during the
recording.  Higgins argued that Trooper Cheek violated his privacy act
rights by not properly advising him he was being recorded.  The State
appealed to the King County Superior Court, which reversed the district
court's suppression order and remanded for a ruling consistent with its
conclusion that the conversations were not private, or if they were, that
Trooper Cheek complied with the advisement requirement in RCW

     These cases involve the same central issue - whether Washington's
privacy act4 applies to conversations between officers and drivers during a
traffic stop.  We accepted review to address disparities in lower courts'
rulings and confusion among law enforcement agencies about this issue.
RALJ 9.1 governs our review of order by courts of limited jurisdiction,5
and the Administrative Procedure Act governs our review of DOL's license
revocation order.6  We review the orders for errors of law and the factual
findings, implicit or explicit, to determine whether they are supported by
substantial evidence.7
I.   Does the Privacy Act Apply?
     Washington's privacy act prohibits intercepting or recording any
private conversation or communication without the consent of all persons
involved.8  Any information obtained in violation of this rule is
inadmissible in Washington courts.9  RCW 9.73.090 exempts law enforcement
personnel from the prohibitions of the general rule in certain instances.10
The exemption at issue here is the in-car video provision, RCW
9.73.090(1)(c).  It creates an exception for '{s}ound recordings that
correspond to video images recorded by video cameras mounted in law
enforcement vehicles,' provided the recordings meet specified conditions.11
     The general exemption language and the in-car video provision read as
(1) The provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 shall not apply to
police, fire, emergency medical service, emergency communication center,
and poison center personnel in the following instances:
. . . .
(c)  Sound recordings that correspond to video images recorded by video
cameras mounted in law enforcement vehicles.  All law enforcement officers
wearing a sound recording device that makes recordings corresponding to
videos recorded by video cameras mounted in law enforcement vehicles must
be in uniform.  A sound recording device which makes a recording pursuant
to this subsection (1)(c) may only be operated simultaneously with the
video camera.  No sound recording device may be intentionally turned off by
the law enforcement officer during the operation of the video camera.
No sound or video recording made under this subsection (1)(c) may be
duplicated and made available to the public by a law enforcement agency
subject to this section until final disposition of any criminal or civil
litigation which arises from the incident or incidents which were recorded.
Such sound recordings shall not be divulged or used by any law enforcement
agency for any commercial purpose.
A law enforcement officer shall inform any person being recorded by sound
under this subsection (1)(c) that a sound recording is being made and the
statement so informing the person shall be included in the sound recording,
except that the law enforcement officer is not required to inform the
person being recorded if the person is being recorded under exigent
circumstances.  A law enforcement officer is not required to inform a
person being recorded by video under this subsection (1)(c) that the person
is being recorded by video.{12}

RCW 9.73.090 is a proviso limiting the circumstances in which the general
rule of the statute applies.  And, the general rule of the privacy act is
that it applies only to 'private' communications.13  Thus, the threshold
inquiry is whether these communications are 'private.'14  We determine
whether a given communication is private on a case-by-case basis.15  Whether
a conversation is private is usually a question of fact, but can be a
question of law if the facts are undisputed.16  Except for the question of
whether Officer Faini informed Lewis he was being recorded, the facts in
both of these cases are undisputed.
     The Legislature has never defined 'private' in the context of the Act,
but we did so in State v. Forrester.17  Relying on the dictionary
definition, we held that the term meant ''. . . secret . . . intended only
for the persons involved (a conversation) . . . holding a confidential
relationship to something . . . a secret message:  a private communication
. . . secretly: not open or in public.''18  In determining whether a
conversation is private, we consider the subjective intent of the parties
involved.19  We also consider additional factors
'bearing on the reasonableness of the participants' expectations, such as
the duration and subject matter of the communication; the location of the
communication and the presence of potential third parties; and the role of
the nonconsenting party and his or her relationship to the consenting
Both Lewis and Higgins concede, as they should, that their conversations
with the arresting officers were not private under this definition.
Rather, they argue that when the Legislature enacted the in-car video
provision,21 it expanded the Act to include non-private traffic stop
conversations not exempted by that provision.  In other words, they assert
that if an in-car recording is not exempt, the captured conversation is per
se covered by the Act regardless of whether it is private.  DOL and the
State respond that the in-car video provision does not expand the coverage
of the Act to include non-private communications.  We review de novo the
construction of a statute.22
     Lewis and Higgins argue that the Act applies per se to traffic stop
conversations where the sound portion is recorded by a police car-mounted
video camera unless the officer complies with the statutory conditions for
an exemption.  They argue that Washington case law already established that
a roadside traffic stop was not private,23 and thus the Legislature had no
reason to create an exception for roadside traffic stops under existing
law.  They maintain that the Legislature would not have enacted the in-car
video provision unless it believed that the exceptions it contains were
necessary because traffic stop conversations would otherwise fall within
the scope of the Act.  Finally, they assert that the State's interpretation
of the statute renders RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) superfluous.
     The State argues that in enacting the in-car video language, the
Legislature did not change the established rule that the Act protects only
private communications and conversations.  It asserts that the provision
established a 'safe harbor' which allows police to record traffic stop
communications without fear that a court would later determine that they
were private and exclude them.  It contends that rather than broadening the
Act, the provision creates a new exception by defining limited conditions
under which police can record even a private conversation without violating
the Act and risking suppression of the evidence.
     Washington courts have not previously interpreted RCW 9.73.090(1)(c).
In doing so, we must give effect to the Legislature's intent,24 and we
discern that intent within the context of the entire statute.25  Courts
presume the Legislature is familiar with past judicial interpretations of
its statutes26 and construe a statute so that no portion is rendered
meaningless or superfluous.27  Where the statute's language is clear, we
derive legislative intent from the statute alone.28  If the statute is
ambiguous, we look to the statute's construction, legislative history, and
relevant case law to determine legislative intent.29  A statute is ambiguous
if one could reasonably give it different interpretations.30
The appropriate office of a proviso or exception is to restrain or modify
the declaring or enacting part of the statute or to except something which
would otherwise be in the enacting clause.  It is not the purpose of a
proviso to enlarge upon the enacting clause.{31}

Lewis and Higgins do not point to anything in the statute or its
legislative history supporting their contention that in enacting the in-car
video provision, the Legislature implicitly created an entire class of non-
private communications that are per se covered by the Act.  Because the Act
only covers 'private' communications, the proviso in turn can only cover
'private' communications.  Nothing in RCW 9.73.090's plain language or
legislative history indicates that the Legislature intended to protect non-
private communications from recording or interception.  If the Legislature
wanted to effect such a major change in the scope of the privacy act, it
would say so explicitly.  We 'will not assume that the Legislature would
effect a significant change in legislative policy by mere implication.'32
     Lewis and Higgins nonetheless assert that the provision becomes
superfluous and meaningless unless the Legislature intended that traffic
stop communications be protected by the Act.  They rely on the Washington
Supreme Court's reasoning in State v. Wanrow.33  There, the court held that
the exemption in RCW 9.73.090(1)(a)34 for incoming phone calls to emergency
personnel had no purpose unless the Legislature believed those calls were
otherwise covered by the Act.35  It stated that 'to interpret the privacy
statute so that no portion of it is superfluous or insignificant, we must
conclude that such telephone calls would fall within RCW 9.73.030(1) but
for their exclusion by RCW 9.73.090.'36       But the Legislature responded
to Wanrow by amending RCW 9.73.090(1)(a) to effectively nullify Wanrow's
holding.37  Later, in State v. Clark, the Washington Supreme Court did not
follow its analysis in Wanrow, but instead addressed the threshold issue of
whether the conversations were private.38  It did not reach the question
whether the recording qualified for an exemption because it held that the
conversations were not private.  This portion of Wanrow is no longer good
We agree with the State's argument that its interpretation does not render
the in-car video provision superfluous or meaningless.  RCW 9.73.090(1)
expands an exemption from the privacy act by allowing sound recordings of
private conversations as long as the recordings are made in accordance with
the statutory conditions.  This is a legitimate legislative purpose.  The
amendment was designed to permit the police to record a traffic stop
conversation even if a court later ruled the conversation was private and
the Act applies.  This interpretation does not render the provision
superfluous or meaningless, and it is supported both by the plain language
and legislative history of the provision.  Contrary to Lewis' and Higgins'
argument that the provision reflects an intent to give traffic stop
conversations more protection under the privacy act, a review of the
legislative history leads to the opposite conclusion.  For example, the
House report states:
People pulled over for a traffic stop have a lower expectation of privacy
than situations involving wiretaps.  Allowing sound recordings in this
context will help ensure officer safety, provide an important evidentiary
tool, and create a checks and balances system for officer conduct.{39}

In passing the in-car video provision, the Legislature intended 'to provide
a very limited exception to the restrictions on disclosure of intercepted
     The Legislature enacted the provision with the expectation that it
would facilitate broader use of sound recordings in traffic stop situations
where potentially private conversations occurred.41  As Lewis and Higgins
acknowledge, sound recordings of non-private traffic stop communications
were already allowed prior to 2000.  If the Legislature intended to expand
the ability of police to audio record traffic stop communications, it had
to allow recording of certain private communications because public
communications could already be recorded.  The in-car video provision
dictates the conditions under which law enforcement can record a traffic
stop conversation even though the communication may be 'private.'
     Section 9.73.090(1) clearly states that the Act's general rule, RCW
9.73.030, does not apply in certain 'instances.'  The general rule
prohibits the interception or recording of private communications.  In the
designated instances where the general rule does not apply, private
communications may be intercepted or recorded.  The in-car video provision
is simply one of those instances in which police may record private traffic
stop communications.  It does not change the rule that the Act covers only
private communications.
     To adopt Lewis' and Higgins' interpretation would require us to infer
the Legislature intended to make a significant change in the scope of the
Act.  But
nothing in the text of the Act or its legislative history indicates that
the Legislature intended the in-car video provision to change the rule that
the Act covers only private communications, and we cannot infer that it
did.42  Thus, the threshold determination in any privacy act claim remains
whether a given communication is 'private.'  Because the communications at
issue here were not private, the in-car video provision does not apply.
II.  Advisement Requirement
     Higgins argues that the in-car video provision requires that police
use specific language when advising the driver that the officer is making
an audio recording.  Although unnecessary to our holding, we discuss the
issue to provide clarification for the lower courts and law enforcement.
     One of the conditions of the in-car video provision requires that the
law enforcement officer advise
any person being recorded by sound under this subsection (1)(c) that a
sound recording is being made and the statement so informing the person
shall be included in the sound recording, except that the law enforcement
officer is not required to inform the person being recorded if the person
is being recorded under exigent circumstances.  A law enforcement officer
is not required to inform a person being recorded by video under this
subsection (1)(c) that the person is being recorded by video.{43}

Trooper Cheek advised Higgins:  'I want to let you know you're being
recorded.'  Higgins argues that Cheek had to advise him that a 'sound'
recording was being made.  The district court agreed with him, holding that
the 'legislative intent and clear and unambiguous language of RCW 9.73.090
mandates the officer inform a defendant a 'sound recording' is being made
and the advice made part of the taped record.  Both are absent here.'  The
State argues that no specific language is required and that Trooper Cheek's
statement properly informed Higgins he was being sound recorded.  As stated
above, Washington courts have not interpreted RCW 9.73.090(1)(c).
Although the statute requires that the officer inform the detained person
that a sound recording is being made, it does not dictate what language an
officer must use.  If the Legislature wanted to require officers to use
only specific words, it could have said so.  The context of the advisement
requirement supports our ruling that Officer Cheek's advisement was
     The in-car video provision also explicitly states that a video
recording without sound requires no notice.  The State argues that the
Legislature used the word 'sound' simply to distinguish between an audio
recording and a video recording.  The Legislative history supports the
State's argument.  In interpreting a statute, we may consider the
differences between sequential drafts of a bill.44  The third version of the
in-car video provision was the first to contain the advisement requirement,
stating only that the officer must advise that a 'recording is being made.'45
There is no mention of 'sound,' and this version also did not reference
video recording.  The fourth and final version of the provision was the
first time the advisement requirement included the word 'sound.'  It was
also the first time the Legislature included language to clarify that no
advisement was necessary for video recordings.46  This demonstrates that the
reason the Legislature used the word 'sound' was to differentiate between
recordings which require notice and those that do not.  Nothing in any of
the drafts of the amendment indicates that the Legislature wanted to
require that officers use specific words in advising a detainee.
     The plain language and legislative history of the advisement
requirement indicates that the advisement need only include language that
would put a reasonable person on notice that the conversation was being
sound recorded.  The State argues that the language Trooper Cheek used put
Higgins on notice that he was being sound recorded.  While including the
word 'sound' or 'audio' would be more explicit, we agree that it is not
necessary.  In fact, it might have a misleading effect because a driver
could interpret the statement to mean there was no video recording.
     A reasonable person would know that the statement 'you're being
recorded' means they are being videotaped or audio taped or both.  Even if
Higgins assumed he was only being videotaped, a claim he does not make, it
is common knowledge that sound typically accompanies video recordings.  We
hold that a reasonable person would understand that the statement 'you are
being recorded' includes sound.

                                   /s/ Agid, J.                  WE CONCUR:

/s/ Schindler, J.                       /s/ Kennedy, J.

     1 While escorting Lewis to the police car, the officers commented that
Lewis was not even awake at that point.  Lewis raised his head, stood up,
and said 'Man, I've been awake, why'd you all do this to me?'  This is the
only audible utterance from Lewis on the tape.
     2 Under Washington's implied consent statute, a driver impliedly
consents to a breath test if arrested by an officer having reasonable
grounds to believe the driver was driving under the influence.  RCW
     3 Refusal to take a breath test requires DOL to revoke the driver's
license. RCW 46.20.308(7).
     4 RCW 9.73.010-.260.
     5 State v. Frank, 112 Wn. App. 515, 520, 49 P.3d 954 (2002).
     6 RCW 34.05.570(3); Burnham v. State Dept. of Social & Health Srvs.,
115 Wn. App. 435, 438, 63 P.3d 816, review denied, 150 Wn.2d 1013 (2003).
     7 Frank, 112 Wn. App. at 520 (citing RALJ 9.1(a), (b));  RCW
34.05.570(3)(d)-(e).  See also Alforde v. Dep't of Licensing, 115 Wn. App.
576, 579, 63 P.3d 170, review denied, 150 Wn.2d 1004 (2003) (discussing
review of license revocations under the implied consent statutory
provision, RCW 46.20.308(9)).
     8 RCW 9.73.030(1)(a)-(b) provides:
     (1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it shall be unlawful
for any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or the state of
Washington, its agencies, and political subdivisions to intercept, or
record any:
     (a) Private communication transmitted by telephone, telegraph, radio,
or other device between two or more individuals between points within or
without the state by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record
and/or transmit said communication regardless how such device is powered or
actuated, without first obtaining the consent of all the participants in
the communication;
     (b) Private conversation, by any device electronic or otherwise
designed to record or transmit such conversation regardless how the device
is powered or actuated without first obtaining the consent of all the
persons engaged in the conversation.
     9 RCW 9.73.050.
     10 RCW 9.73.090(1).
     11 RCW 9.73.090(1)(c).
     12 Id.
     13 State v. Clark, 129 Wn.2d 211, 224, 916 P.2d 384 (1996) (citing
Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dep't, 119 Wn.2d 178, 189, 829 P.2d 1061
     14 State v. Flora, 68 Wn. App. 802, 808, 845 P.2d 1355 (1992).
     15 Clark, 129 Wn.2d at 232 n.18.
     16 State v. Christensen, 119 Wn. App. 74, 79 P.3d 12 (2003) (citing
Clark, 129 Wn.2d at 225), reversed on other grounds,    Wn.2d    , 102 P.3d
789 (2004).
     17 21 Wn. App. 855, 861, 587 P.2d 179 (1978), review denied, 92 Wn.2d
1006 (1979).
     18 Id. (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1969)).
The Washington Supreme Court adopted this definition of 'private' in
Kadoranian, 119 Wn.2d at 190.
     19 Clark, 129 Wn.2d at 226 (citing State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476, 910
P.2d 447 (1996)).
     20 Christensen, 119 Wn. App. at 78-79 (quoting Townsend, 147 Wn.2d at
     21 RCW 9.73.090(1)(c).
     22 State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 346, 68 P.3d 282 (2003).
     23 See Clark, 129 Wn.2d at 215 (holding that 'conversations on public
streets between the defendants and a stranger who happened to be an
undercover police informant' are not private); State v. Bonilla, 23 Wn.
App. 869, 873, 598 P.2d 783 (1979) (conversations with police dispatcher
are not private); Flora, 68 Wn. App. at 808 (when arrestee recorded
interaction with officer during arrest, court held the exchange was not
     24 Wentz, 149 Wn.2d at 346 (citing Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc. v.
Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 123 Wn.2d 621, 629, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994)).
     25 Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wn.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999)
(citing State v. Elgin, 118 Wn.2d 551, 556, 825 P.2d 314 (1992); State ex
rel. Royal v. Bd. of Yakima County Comm'rs, 123 Wn.2d 451, 459, 869 P.2d 56
     26 State v. Calderon, 102 Wn.2d 348, 351, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984) (citing
Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 97 Wn.2d 880, 887, 652 P.2d 948 (1982)).
     27 Id. (citing Stone v. Chelan County Sheriff's Dep't, 110 Wn.2d 806,
810, 756 P.2d 736 (1988); Tommy P. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 97 Wn.2d 385,
391, 645 P.2d 697 (1982)).
     28 Wentz, 149 Wn.2d at 346.
     29 State v. Watson, 146 Wn.2d 947, 955, 51 P.3d 66 (2002).
     30 Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov't v. Wash. State Boundary Review
Bd., 127 Wn.2d 759, 771, 903 P.2d 953 (1995).
     31 Jepson v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 89 Wn.2d 394, 403, 573 P.2d 10
     32 Calderon, 102 Wn.2d at 351 (quoting In re Marriage of Little, 96
Wn.2d 183, 634 P.2d 498 (1981)).
     33 88 Wn.2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
     34 Formerly RCW 9.73.090(1).
     35 88 Wn.2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
     36 Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d at 228 (citation omitted).
     37 See Bonilla, 23 Wn. App. at 873-74.
     38 See 129 Wn.2d 211, 916 P.2d 384 (1996).
     39 H.B. Rep. on H.B. 2903, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2000).
     40 Laws of 2000, ch. 195, sec. 1.
41 For example, it would allow police to record a conversation between two
passengers in the car even though the passengers intended the conversation
to be private if the officer complied with the statutory conditions.  The
content of the 'private' conversation could then be offered in a court
     42 Calderon, 102 Wn.2d at 351.
     43 RCW 9.73.090(1)(c).
     44 State v. Martin, 94 Wn.2d 1, 19, 614 P.2d 164 (1980).
     45 Third Substitute H.B. 2903, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2000).
46 H.B. 2903, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2000).